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Recent Cases
PERSONAL PROPERTY

-

REPLEVIN

-

PREJUDGMENT

SEIZURE OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS
Laprease v. Raymours FurnitureCo.,
315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
A three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York recently held in Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.' that provisions of a New York statute2 permitting the prejudgment seizure of chattels in a replevin action,
without an order of a judge or court of competent jurisdiction, are
unconstitutional. The court held that a summary repossession under
the statute violated the procedural due process requirements of the
14th amendment and the search and seizure provisions of the fourth
amendment.
The statute in question, article 71 of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules, governs the procedure for bringing an action "to
try the right of possession of a chattel,"' historically known as a replevin action, and is typical of most state replevin statutes. The
New York statute provides that the sheriff of any county in which
the chattel is found, upon the plaintiff's delivery to him of an affidavit, an undertaking, and a requisition, shall seize the chattels described in the affidavit. 4 The sheriff is authorized to forcibly enter
a building or enclosure to search for and seize the chattel.' The
statute states that "[t]he requisition shall be deemed the mandate of
the court,"6 but in fact it is only the mandate of the plaintiff's attorney, issued without the examination or approval of an intervening
magistrate. The undertaking is a statement obtained by the plaintiff,
binding a surety to secure the chattel seized in an amount not less
than twice its value, thus insuring the return of the chattel to any
person awarded possession and the payment of any judgment
awarded against the plaintiff.7
The creditor-plaintiff does not have to commence an action be1315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
2
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 7101-12 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1970).

31d. § 7101.
4Id. § 7102(a).

51d. § 7110.
61d. § 7102(d).
"id. § 7102(e).
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fore serving the papers on the sheriff, but if an action has not been
commenced, he must also deliver to the sheriff a summons and a complaint.8 The sheriff is required to serve a copy of the plaintiff's
affidavit, requisition, and undertaking upon the person from whom
the chattel is seized; the sheriff need not serve such person with any
summons or complaint.9 Thus, seizure of the debtor's chattel may
occur without any prior notice to the debtor.
The sheriff retains possession of the seized chattel for a period of
3 days. He then delivers it to the plaintiff, unless in the meantime
he has been served with a notice of exception to plaintiff's surety,
notice of a motion for an impounding order, or papers to reclaim
the chattel. 10 The chattel may be reclaimed by any person claiming
the right to possession, except a subordinated creditor claiming only
a lien on the chattel, by filing with the sheriff a notice of reclaimer,
an undertaking in the same amount as the plaintiff's, and an affidavit
similar to that required of the plaintiff."
In the Laprease case, defendant-creditor Raymours Furniture Co.,
pursuant to the provisions of article 71, attempted to seize a bed
and other essential household furnishings of the plaintiff. The defendant advised Mrs. Laprease that if she did not release the items
a forcible entry into her apartment would be made, but defendant's
representatives agreed to forego a forcible entry and seizure if the
plaintiff made certain specified payments. Mrs. Laprease, who was
on welfare and unable to make the required payments, filed suit
seeking to enjoin the defendants from making the seizure. She alleged that she was in "immediate danger" of having items which
were "necessary and essential for the healthy and proper living arrangements of her family" forcibly seized. A temporary restraining order was issued by the district court,12 until a three-judge court
was convened to hear the plaintiff's application for interlocutory and
permanent injunctive relief.'3
8Id. § 7102(a).
9Id. § 7102(b).
l Id. § 7102(f).

"id. § 7103(a).
12Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(3) (1964), a party may apply to a district judge
for an interlocutory injunction against the enforcement of a state statute. Upon a showing that irreparable injury would result if the temporary restraining order were not
granted, the district judge may grant the temporary relief until a hearing and determination of the constitutionality of the statute by a full three-judge court.
13
Applications for interlocutory or permanent injunctions to restrain the operation
of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute must be heard by a three-judge district court.
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
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The three-judge court unanimously held that that part of the
New York statute which authorized the prejudgment seizure of chattels in a replevin action without even an ex parte order of a judge or
court did not comport with procedural due process of law required
under the 14th amendment for the taking of property. The court
stated that procedural due process requires that notice and an opportunity to be heard be provided the debtor before seizure, or at
least that the creditor present to a judicial authority the circumstances allegedly justifying an ex parte summary action. The court's
holding rests upon its interpretation of a recent Supreme Court decision, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,'4 which struck down Wisconsin's prejudgment wage garnishment procedure as a violation of
procedural due process.' 5 The Court in Sniadach specifically held
that notice and a hearing were required before a person's wages
could be garnished because wages are "a specialized type of property
presenting distinct problems in our economic system," which, when
garnished, "impose tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support."' 16
Sniadach dealt with the prejudgment attachment of wages, while
the Laprease case involved the prejudgment attachment of personal
property in the form of furniture and other household items. However, the Lapreasecourt found that:
Beds, stoves, mattresses, dishes, tables, and other necessaries for
ordinary day-to-day living are, like wages in Sniadach, a "special-

ized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic
system," the taking of which on the unilateral command of an ad-

14 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
15 Under Wisconsin's garnishment procedure, the clerk of courts, at the request of
the creditor's lawyer, issued papers authorizing the garnishment of the debtor's wages.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.04 (West Supp. 1970). The creditor's lawyer then served the
garnishee and set in motion the machinery whereby a prescribed portion of the debtor's
wages were frozen. Id. § 267.18(2) (a). Notice or copies of the summons and complaint did not have to be served upon the debtor until 10 days after service upon the
garnishee. Id. at 267.07. The garnishment was removed if the debtor won on the merits in a subsequent suit on the debt. Id. § 267.16.
16 395 U.S. at 340. Mr. Justice Harlan stated that "due process is afforded only by
the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at
least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he
can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use." Id. at 343 (concurring opinion). See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950), where the Court stated that "this right to be heard has little reality or worth
unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself to appear
or default, acquiesce or contest."
For an extended discussion of Sniadacb, see Note, Garnishment Statutes and Due
Process: The Effect of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 7 HARv. J.LEGIS. 231 (1970).
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verse party, "may impose tremendous hardships" on purchasers of
17
these essentials.
Besides the drain on family income, Mr. Justice Douglas pointed
out in Sniadach some of the collateral consequences of wage garnishments. 8 With his wages threatened, the desparate debtor often
makes settlements with the creditor in which he agrees to pay additional high finance and collection costs. Likewise, under the New
York procedure in Laprease, the ability of the creditor to effectuate
the threat of repossession, together with the usual inability of the
consumer to post the security required by the statute to reclaim the
goods, results in inflated refinancing agreements.
Thus, the Laprease court interpreted the Sniadach decision as
holding that the unconstitutionality of prejudgment wage garnishments results from the hardship imposed upon the debtor. Since
the hardships imposed upon Mrs. Laprease were as severe as those
imposed upon the worker whose wages are attached, the Laprease
court extended the Sniadach holding to bar the prejudgment seizure
of "necessities for ordinary day-to-day living."
This interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court's decision
in Goldberg v. Kelly,' 9 decided after Sniadach, which held that New
York's procedure for terminating welfare benefits without notice or
a prior hearing for the recipient was a violation of procedural due
process. As in Sniadach, the Court emphasized that the crucial factor
was the hardship imposed upon the welfare recipient. Welfare
payments provide the means to obtain essential food, clothing, and
housing. To summarily terminate such aid, pending a later decision
on the recipient's eligibility, may deprive an eligible person of the
the decision; in the meantime his situameans to live while he awaits
20
desperate.
tion becomes
The court in Laprease stated that an ex parte hearing prior to
seizure, at which the creditor presents to a judicial officer circumstances allegedly justifying summary action, may afford procedural
due process. This statement is consistent with Sniadach, wherein
Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that a summary garnishment pro'7

315 F. Supp. at 722.

See also Note, lVage Garnishment as a Collection Device,
1967 WIs. L. REv. 759.
" 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
20 Id. at 264. "By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without funds or assets
18 395 U.S. at 340-41.

....

Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of ...

'brutal need'

without a prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justify it." Id. at 261, quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899-900
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd sub. nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22: 342

cedure like Wisconsin's might be appropriate under special circumstances."- The Laprease court was careful to specify, however, that
a creditor must present his special circumstances to a judge or court of
competent jurisdiction - not merely to his lawyer - for a determination of whether a summary proceeding is justified.
The recent case of Fuentes v. Faircloth,22 decided in the southern
district of Florida, demonstrates that not all federal courts are
willing to extend the Sniadach and Goldberg holdings as far as the
Laprease court did. In Fuentes a three-judge court held that Florida's
replevin statute,23 which permits a conditional seller to repossess a
chattel without a prior hearing, was constitutional. The Florida
court emphasized that its case involved a secured transaction in
which the contract authorized the conditional seller to repossess in
order to protect his security interest in the goods, and that the court
would not interfere with the right of the parties to privately contract.24 The Fuentes court distinguished Goldberg and Sniadach,
stating that the hardships facing a deprived welfare recipient and a
debtor whose wages are garnished are not present in the repossession
of consumer goods. In Fuentes the goods repossessed were a gas
stove and a stereo. While the repossession of a stereo can be said to
produce no hardship, one would have to question the Florida court's
determination that hardship would not result from the summary repossession of a gas stove. If the Supreme Court decides to extend
the reasoning of Sniadach and Goldberg to require notice and a
hearing prior to repossession of chattels, where the objects of repossession are items necessary for day-to-day living, then a prehearing repossession of a gas stove would undoubtedly be unconstitutional.
The second constitutional issue present in both the Laprease and
21

395 U.S. at 339.

22 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris, noted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S.

Feb. 22, 1971) (No. 6060).
23
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-21 (Supp. 1971).
24 The Laprease court stated that the fact that Sniadach dealt with an unsecured interest and in Laprease the vendor's interests were secured made no difference because the
purchasers claimed there were no defaults and no right to repossession.
Whether the Supreme Court would decide that a contractual provision in a security
agreement, allowing automatic repossession upon default, waives a debtor's right to the
protection of the 14th amendment is uncertain. If it does act as a waiver, there is the additional question of whether it is a competent and intelligent waiver. See text accompanying note 35 infra. If the Supreme Court should extend Sniadach to cover the summary repossession of chattels bought under security agreements, the extension will affect
the vast majority of states which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
Section 9-503 of the UCC authorizes a secured party to repossess upon default, without
judicial process, if the repossession can be effected without a breach of the peace.
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Fuentes cases concerned whether their respective replevin statutes
violated the fourth amendment. The Laprease court held that section 7110 of the New York statute,2" authorizing the sheriff to
forcibly seize the chattel, and section 7102, commanding him to
"seize the chattel without delay when the plaintiff delivers to him an
affidavit, requisition, and undertaking,"26 violated the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment as applied to the states by
the 14th amendment.27 Reasoning that the warrantless search of
a private dwelling is presumptively unreasonable, 28 the court found
no compelling circumstances necessitating authorization of a warrantless search. The court concluded that "fi]f the Sheriff cannot invade
the privacy of a home without a warrant when the state interest is
to prevent crime, he should not be able to do so to retrieve a stove or
refrigerator about which the right to possession is disputed."'2'
The Florida statute in Fuentes authorizes forcible entry into any
dwelling or enclosure if the chattel sought is not delivered to the
officer after public demand.30 The court, however, found that no
fourth amendment issue was raised in view of Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,31 which held that the fourth
amendment does not restrict civil proceedings for the recovery of
debts. The Florida court failed to recognize that the holding of
that case has been vitiated by more recent cases such as Camara v.
Municipal Court,32 and See v. City of Seattle,3 both of which held
that the fourth amendment's search and seizure provisions were applicable to administrative inspections, even though no criminal activity was suspected.
§ 7110 (McKinney 1963).
261d. § 7102(a).
2
7 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also Ker v.California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963).
25 N.Y.Civ. PRAc. LAw

28

See Camara v.Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
315 F. Supp. at 722.
0 FLA. STAT.ANN.§ 78.10 (Supp. 1971).
8159 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
82 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
3 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
3
4"It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal be29
3

havior." Camarav. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
Since Camara and See were decided, the Supreme Court has declared that a search
warrant is not necessary for a state-required home visit by a caseworker to a person receiving aid-to-dependent-children benefits. Wyman v. James, 39 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S.
Jan. 12, 1971). The Court indicated its intent not to overrule Camera and See. It
held that the caseworkers' visits were not searches within the ambit of the fourth amendment. The Court held on alternate grounds that even if the visits were searches, they
were reasonable ones, because of numerous public interest considerations, and thus did
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The Fuentes court stated that even if the fourth amendment were
applicable, there was no violation because the parties agreed by contract that the creditor could enter the premises of the debtor to repossess upon default. Furthermore, the court stated, although a
forcible entry and repossession might raise a constitutional question
even where there is such a contract, there was a peaceable entry in
this case. The Florida court, however, failed to consider whether
the fine print in the usual conditional sales contract gives rise to a
competent and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right.3 5 And it
failed to consider whether the "peaceable" entry was the result of
an effective consent to the search and seizure. Such effective consent at least requires that there be no duress or coercion, either express or implied, against the person with the possessory rights in the
property. 6 For these reasons, it appears that the Fuentes court disposed of the fourth amendment issue in too cursory a fashion.
In all probability, the Supreme Court will eventually resolve the
due process and the search and seizure issues raised by the Laprease
and Fuentes decisions. 37 When it does, the Court will have to decide
whether the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment
are applicable to civil summary proceedings used in the recovery of
debts, and if so, whether contractual provisions in security agreements suffice to waive this constitutional protection. In addition, the
Court will have to decide whether the summary repossession of
goods that are necessary for day-to-day living imposes such a hardship upon a debtor that it justifies extending the Sniadach holding
to protect against these creditor actions. And, if such repossessions
are covered by the Sniadach rule, the Court will have to define the
scope of the term "necessities for day-to-day living."
not require a warrant. In cases like Laprease and Fuentes, involving the repossession
of household goods, a search and seizure obviously takes place, and the public interest
considerations that existed in James are not present.
35
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
36
See United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962). See also Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968), where the Court held that consent to an otherwise
illegal search and seizure imposes a burden upon the state to prove that "consent was,
in fact, freely and voluntarily given." For a thorough discussion of what constitutes
an effective consent, see Comment, Requirement of an Effective Consent to a Warrantless
Search, 3 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC & PRoc. 403-21 (1970).
37 The Court has noted probable jurisdiction for the Fuentes appeal. 39 U.S.L.W.
3359 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1971), (No. 6060).

